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MORE ON THE POSSIBILITY OF GOD 
Clement Dore 
In this paper, I draw a distinction between two kinds of impossibility and 
maintain that one is entitled to suppose that they do not obtain, in the absence 
of a reason to think that they do. I claim that there is no reason to think that 
the first kind obtains with respect to God and that, though there are non-
negligible arguments that the second kind does, my argument for the possi-
bility of God, which appeared in an earlier volume of this journal, adequately 
rebuts those arguments. 
James Patrick Downey has offered a criticism of an argument of mine for 
the logical possibility of God's existence which appeared in an earlier issue 
of this journal. l The essence of Downey's criticism lies in the following 
quote: 
If possible existence is included in the concept of an individual, A, does this 
not establish that it is a conceptual truth that A is possible? No, for consider 
the concept of Arthur, the supremely perfect being that is F and not F for 
some property F. If possible existence is a perfection, then it is logically 
included in the concept of Arthur, since that concept includes all perfections. 
Nevertheless, it does not follow that it is a conceptual truth that Arthur is 
possible. That Arthur is possible cannot be any sort of truth. Since the concept 
of Arthur is not consistent, there can be no such being.2 
Downey draws the conclusion that the fact that logical possibility is (also) 
included in the concept of God does not entail that God is logically pos-
sible. 
In replying to Downey, it will be useful for me to start by drawing a 
distinction between what I shall call ~narrowly logically impossible descrip-
tions" (NLI-descriptions) and "broadly logically impossible descriptions" 
(BLI-descriptions). The former are descriptions that contain "F and not F" 
and equivalent expressions, and the latter are descriptions which, though they 
do not, are nonetheless such that it is logically impossible for them to apply 
to anything. ~ Arthurhood" is an NLI-description. Examples of BLI-descrip-
tions are as follows: "having shape but no size," "being red all over and green 
all over," ~being north of something X, which is north of something Y, 
without being north of Y," and ~being a person who has as much power and 
knowledge as God and who is nonetheless distinct from God." 
Now it is, I think, clear that when we assert that something, which bears a 
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certain description, exists, we are not always committed to showing that such 
a thing is logically possible. Rather, barring that it is self-evidently logically 
impossible, there is an onus on anyone who maintains that it is in fact logi-
cally impossible to present an argument for that claim. And this is true of 
NLI-descriptions and of BLI-descriptions. If a given description, D, is not 
self-evidently an NLI-description, then there is an onus on anyone who main-
tains that it is to show that this is so. And, similarly, if D is not self-evidently 
a BLI-description, then there is also an onus on someone who claims that it 
is in fact BLI to argue for his claim. 
Now, "being a supremely perfect being" is, unlike "Arthurhood," not self-
evidently an NLI-description. And I submit that no one (including Downey) 
has successfully proven that it is NLI. On the other hand, there are nonnegligi-
ble arguments for the conclusion that it is a BLI-description. One such argu-
ment goes as follows: 
"Consider the following pseudo-demonstration: 
(1) Let 'a super-centaur' = DF 'a centaur that exists with logical necessity.' 
Then 
But 
And 
So 
(2) if a super-centaur exists, then it exists with logical necessity. 
(3) whatever is such that if it exists, then it exists with logical necessity, 
is also such that, if it is logically possible that it exists, then it exists. 
(See S5.) 
(4) it is logically possible that super-centaurs exist. 
(5) super-centaurs exist. 
Plainly, we must hold that this argument, and similar arguments for the 
existence of similar Gaunilo-type entities, are unsound. For we can refuse 
to do so only upon pain of accepting a wildly inflated ontology. But the 
argument is clearly valid, and the most plausible candidate for being a false 
premise is the assertion that it is logically possible that there are super-cen-
taurs. However, since the concept of God, a supremely perfect being, is such 
that a closely similar modal argument for God's existence can be con-
structed, it would be irrationally arbitrary to affirm that God is logically 
possible, unless there is an argument that he is. And no such argument is 
available." 
Now my argument for the possibility of God should be taken as, among 
other things, an attempt to rebut the foregoing argument and not to refute the 
claim that "supremely perfect being" is an NLI-description. For, once again, 
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there is no onus on anyone to show that a given description is not NU, unless 
either it is, like Arthur, self-evidently so (in which case this cannot be shown), 
or there is a plausible argument that it is; and neither of these conditions is 
satisfied with respect to "supremely perfect being." 
Finally, there are two further nonnegligible arguments that "supremely 
perfect being" is BU: 
1. "As was said in connection with the pseudo demonstration of the exis-
tence of super-centaurs, 
So 
But 
(a) if it is logically possible that a supremely perfect being exists, then he 
exists with logical necessity. 
(b) 'it is logically possible that a supremely perfect being exists' is logically 
incompatible with 'it is logically possible that a supremely perfect being does 
not exist.' 
(c) the latter proposition is as apt to be true as the former one, in the absence 
of an argument for the former one which is not also an argument for the latter 
one. 
And 
So 
(d) no such argument is available. 
(e) modal arguments for the existence of God are no stronger than the 
argument that, since it is possible that God does not exist, God does not 
exist. 
2. "Dore has claimed in effect that statements of the form, 'It is possibly 
true that p,' do not need to be defended unless they are self-evidently false 
or there is a plausible argument that they are false. But in fact this does 
not hold true when p is a mathematical, or a logical, axiom or theorem, 
precisely because such propositions are, if possibly true, true. And 'God 
exists' bears the latter description. So it will no more do to assert without 
argument that 'God exists' is possibly true than to assert without argument 
that, say, Goldbach's conjecture or Fermat's last theorem is possibly true. 
However, no argument for the claim that 'God exists' is possibly true is 
available." 
So go the arguments. My reply to Downey is, in essence, that my demon-
stration of the possibility of God would be superfluous if it were an attempt 
to show that God is not Arthur-like, since there is no reason to think that he 
is, but that it is not superfluous if we construe it as an attempt to rebut the 
three arguments for God's broadly logical impossibility, which I have pre-
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sented above. Moreover, as against Downey, I contend that, since the concept 
of logical possibility is included in the concept of God, and since "God (the 
supremely perfect being)" is neither self-evidently NU nor self-evidently 
BU, we have reason to reject the envisaged arguments. 
Vanderbilt University 
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